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Purpose - As cyber-attacks continue to grow, organisations adopting the internet-of-things (IoT) have
continued to react to security concerns that threaten their businesses within the current highly competitive
environment. Many recorded industrial cyber-attacks have successfully beaten technical security solutions by
exploiting human-factor vulnerabilities related to security knowledge and skills, and manipulating human
elements into inadvertently conveying access to critical industrial assets. Knowledge and skill capabilities
contribute to human analytical proficiencies for enhanced cybersecurity readiness. Thus, a human-factored
security endeavour is required to investigate the capabilities of the human constituents (workforce) to
appropriately recognise and respond to cyber intrusion events within the industrial control system (ICS)
environment.
Methodology - A quantitative approach (statistical analysis) is adopted to provide an approach to quantify
the potential cybersecurity capability aptitudes of industrial human actors, identify the least security-capable
workforce in the operational domain with the greatest susceptibility likelihood to cyber-attacks (i.e., weakest
link), and guide the enhancement of security assurance. To support these objectives, a Human-factored Cyber
Security Capability Evaluation approach is presented using conceptual analysis techniques.
Findings - Using a test scenario, the approach demonstrates the capacity to proffer an efficient evaluation
of workforce security knowledge and skills capabilities, and the identification of weakest link in the workforce.
Practical Implications - The approach can enable organisations to gain better workforce security
perspectives like security-consciousness, alertness, and response aptitudes, thus guide organisations into
adopting strategic means of appropriating security remediation outlines, scopes, and resources without undue
wastes or redundancies.
Originality/value – This work demonstrates originality by providing a framework and computational
approach for characterising and quantify human-factor security capabilities based on security knowledge and
security skills. It also supports the identification of potential security weakest links amongst an evaluated
industrial workforce (human agents), some key security susceptibility areas, and relevant control interventions.
The model and validation results demonstrate the application of action research. The study demonstrates
originality by illustrating how action research can be applied within socio-technical dimensions to solve
recurrent and dynamic problems related to industrial environment cyber security improvement. It provides
value by demonstrating how theoretical security knowledge (awareness) and practical security skills can help
resolve cyber security response and control uncertainties within industrial organisations.
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1 Introduction
Cybersecurity in industry control system (ICS) environments has become a growing issue of both national and
global security over the last decade. The evolving information technology – operation technology (IT-OT)
convergence now implies that organisations, firms, industries, and factories, embracing the much-acclaimed
industry 4.0 and industrial internet-of-things (IIoT) paradigms, are reliant on IT infrastructures, open standards
and technologies, and the internet (Knowles et al., 2015). It also means that these organisational platforms are
susceptible to cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks. ICS is an all-purpose (common) term used to describe
various types of automated industrial systems that control, monitor, and manage industrial processes
(Macaulay and Singer, 2012; Stouffer et al., 2015). An Industrial Control System Environment (ICSE) refers
to a domain where industrial control operations and processes are performed. The basic functions of an ICS
involve: sensor measurements, hardware control for actuators (breakers, switches, monitors), human-machine
interfacing, and remote diagnostics and maintenance utilities (Amin and Sastry, 2015) (Nicholson et al., 2012).
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array of security susceptibilities are as well introduced, which threaten the functional reliability of operations
in the industrial domain (Abe et al., 2016). Over the last years, records continue to show an alarming increase
in cyber threats and attacks against ICSs globally.
The attack landscape against ICSEs have strikingly widened with remarkable dynamic patterns of attack
vectors (Luallen, 2014; Brassso, 2016; Harp and Gregory-Brown, 2016; Paganini, 2016). Industrial cyber
security, SCADA security, etc, are now buzz words for common topics of conversations amongst everyday
industrial technology users (Evans et al., 2016), and have become necessities towards normal operations in the
industrial domain. Technically, security in IT is fairly standardised and differs from how it applies to ICS. The
differences between the two chiefly border on operational requirements and prioritisation (Macaulay and
Singer, 2012). Unlike the IT, most ICS security compromises have associated physical consequences and
impacts. These are often more severe and abrupt than in the IT domain. Security issues in the ICS environment
often appear in the form of habitual maintenance failures and other process anomalies, which make difficult
the diagnosis and resolution of the issues. The main reasons for the difficulty of managing the security of ICSE
include: vastly dispersed assets with frequent compulsory remote access requirements, traditional IT security
applications such as antiviruses and firewalls may not be suitable for compatibility issues, and when possible,
application could affect system availability which is not acceptable for ICS as a high-availability system. Older
ICS systems are often not open to patching or upgrades. (Macaulay and Singer, 2012; Drias, Serhrouchni and
Vogel, 2015). Cyber security threats to ICS encompass threat vectors like non-typical network protocols and
instruction sets that cannot be blocked for operations, performance, and safety reasons (e.g. event and alarm
traffics). More contextually, technical security control may well be easily subverted by intelligent adversaries
who can easily deceive unaware, unskilled, and unsuspecting ICS operators and users into undertaking actions
and activities that can grant the attackers easy access and high privilege capacities to execute their malicious
intents. These are often also undetectable by security alert systems until serious damages and anomalies begin
to emerge (Johansson, Sommestad and Ekstedt, 2009; Fan et al., 2015).
As cyber-attacks exacerbate, organisations have become concerned about how to react to security trends that
threaten their business and operational relevance within the current highly-competitive business environment.
Many recorded industrial cyber breaches have effectively beaten technological security solutions through
exploiting human-factor limitations in knowledge and skills. These attack patterns have manipulated human
elements into unintentionally conveying access to critical industrial assets. Cyber security has indeed become
a necessary objective to achieve uninterrupted industrial functions in a changing operational technology
environment. One way of defining cyber security is ‘the harmonisation of capabilities in people, processes,
and(or) technologies; to secure and control both authorised and/or unlawful access, disruption, destruction, or
modification of electronic computing systems (hardware, software, and networks), the data and information
they hold’ (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016). However, most current security solutions are technology-inclined.
People and process security contexts and requirements are often not considered (Ramakrishnan and Testani,
2011), often resulting in lopsided security that are malignantly exploited by malicious intelligent actors.
An ICS is a system of industrial technologies and infrastructures built and(or) operated by people (workforce)
for the execution of processes towards attaining target products or services. It implies that securing technology
(hardware and/or software) alone resolves only a fraction of the larger security problem. A technology is often
as weak and vulnerable as the people (workforce) that develop and(or) operate it, and the process(es) designed
and structured to use it. For example, suppose Alice is a process engineer that operates an engineering
workstation asset of an ICS, and employs technology ‘A’ firewall and technology ‘B’ Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) to protect her workstation from security compromise. Assuming Alice is unaware and unable to
recognise various forms and signatures of social engineering attack schemes. Bob as an intelligent and
predetermined attacker employs a deceptive spear-phishing means unknown to Alice and deceives her into
clicking or running links or attachments on her workstation that literally enables a backdoor (entry point) into
Alice’s system and network via a direct remote access. This happens seamlessly despite the presence and
functionalities of techs ‘A’ and ‘B’ security features. Alice’s security ignorance, her uninformed and unskilled
state in relations to evolving ICSE security trends such as confronted her, and her consequent actions or
inactions undervalues techs ‘A’ and ‘B’; opening the door to an enemy attacker Bob.
The above theoretical scenario highlights the importance of human-factors in ICSE cyber security assurance,
especially emphasising the significance of security knowledge (awareness) and practical skills. Human-factor
is as important as technical factors in ICSE security. Real scenarios also consolidate this viewpoint. Probably,
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since the network was air-gapped from external networks. Thus, the attackers used infected USB drive parking
lot attack technique on a third party maintenance organisation, and relied upon human actors connecting the
infected devices to their industrial network and provide means for reaching and delivering Stuxnet to the
nuclear plant network (Murphy, 2015). Earlier works on the concept of security competence (capability) by
Workman et al (2008), which investigated the “knowing-doing” gap in individuals showed that such
individuals can have appropriate security skills and knowledge yet not apply these skills in consistent manner.
Also, based on the analysed results of 588 workforce members of a technology service company, Workman et
al (2008) concludes with the recommendation that security technology should be user-centred to avoid
assessment tensions that can affect responses.
Probable motivations for these attacks may have stemmed from the perception that: (i) most ICSE workforce
(personnel) are often unfamiliar with advanced digital (cyber) security concepts, and (ii) Information
Technology security workforce are often unfamiliar with ICSE operational concepts, and (iii) intelligent
attackers now consider human actors (workforce) within the industrial environment as weak attractive exploit
targets into operational system and networks (Howarth, 2014). The bid improve security in the ICSE through
plugging the holes enumerated above provides motivation for engaging this research direction. Updated
security awareness and training can increase security capabilities, thus, presents a viable solution to this issue.
However, engaging proper security capabilities hinges on an adequate understanding of recurrent security
capacities of the workforce, and a clear outline of areas of weaknesses and strengths. Effectively improving
security capacities of a workforce will typically require building strengths in the identified weak areas.
This work builds up on an earlier work on evaluating an industrial environment’s security capability based on
the quantification of inherent cybersecurity knowledge and skills of the human workforce. Improvements are
introduced I the aspect of computationally evaluating and inferring security incapability
(vulnerability/susceptibility level) of human-agents from their evaluated capability. This simplifies the process
of characterising weak links amongst the workforce members involved. Thus, this study highlights the
importance of evaluating workforce security capacities, identifying the weakest security capability member in
the workforce (weakest link), and the culminated significance of this approach towards overall security
assurance. Understanding the measure of cybersecurity knowledge and skill capacities of the industrial
workforce, and keeping abreast with the newest activities and trends in the cyber threat landscape can support
the identification of attacks before they happen. As new threats continue to emerge, learning the capability
postures of the workforce, determining specific gaps, and plugging into the gaps with the right intelligence,
all add-up a potential to minimize damages if a security breach occurs (Mandiant, 2017). In an ICSE, human
elements are critical assets and should form a line of defence against security threats. Effectively consolidating
security and defence capacities of these elements can be most effective following an understanding of the
current security capability and vulnerability levels. This will support informed control applications.
This work aims to provide a human-centred security capability and vulnerability evaluation method which can
be used to evaluate the security aptitude of human agents within ICSE. This evaluation approach complements
traditional technical capability and vulnerability analysis, thus enables a wider view of vulnerability
assessment of an industrial environment where both technology and human agents are involved. More
specifically, it explores how to understand and attribute quantitative ratings to security aptitudes of human
agents in ICSE, and use such information to drive a robust industrial cyber security responsiveness and
resilience. The approach and measures can be useful to security auditors, analysts, managers and industrial
system owners in carrying out human-level threats and vulnerabilities assessments, identify most vulnerable
human agents, as well as the areas where security is low. Responding to these, can significant influence
improvement of overall organisational security. The contribution of this article includes; providing a novel
approach for characterising and quantifying human-factor security capabilities based on security knowledge
and security skills. It also supports the identification of potential security weakest links amongst an evaluated
industrial workforce (human agents). It involves concept description and capability evaluations was associated
with defined security standards, guidelines, and baseline requirements. The methodology then prescribed
control interventions that are based on discovered weak links and weak security areas.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 discusses human-factor security issues and requirements,
and statistical justifications for the need of human-factored approach to ICS security. Section 3 presents a
review of related works in capability evaluations relating to contexts, methods, and tools. Sections 4 presents
an overview of the proposed workforce capability evaluation model. Section 5 discusses the validation scenario
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the research.
2 Human-Related Security Issues and Requirements
As cyber-attacks continue to evolve, businesses and organisations have not ceased to express and react to
security concerns that threaten their business and operational relevance within the currently highly-competitive
business domain (Ralston, Graham and Hieb, 2007; Mirashe and Kalyankar, 2010). Many organisations keep
updating technologies equipped with defensive capacities to protect automation processes from cyber
intrusions or breaches. Notwithstanding, cyber-attacks and incidents against industrial control environments
have continued to rise for couple of reasons. The most important is the reality of a drastic change in targeted
vectors of attacks (Knowles et al., 2015). While organisations continue to invest heavily on technology
security, attackers have strategically side-tracked attack concentration from technology to people (human)
assets (IRM, 2015), since humans (users) typically need to interact with technologies to initiate, implement,
and/or manage industrial processes. Somehow, recorded events clearly demonstrate that the analytical
proficiencies of the human constituents through the exploitation of cognitive capacities are still crucial for
effective security in ICS environment (Chen et al., 2012; Gonzalez et al., 2014; Ben-Asher and Gonzalez,
2015). This is enabled by the existence and expression of easily exploited human weakness in the system
process interaction loop. For instance, the analysis of the 2013 data breach against Target Corporation showed
that Target’s security technology was capable of detecting the breach, but the people (leaders and general
employees) who should have been able to take appropriate responses to control the attack impacts, lacked the
necessary skills and knowledge (Hershberger, 2014). The attack caused a disaster that cost Target about $148
million, and other financial institutions about $200 million (Tobias, 2014). If Target had proactively evaluated
the cybersecurity capability of its workforce and understood the potential knowledge and skills strengths and
weaknesses much earlier, such episteme would have spurred the corporation to improve security capability of
their workforce in relations to cyber-security awareness, self-protection, organisational preservation, and a
security conscious and cultured attitude, and cyber incident response.
Weak cybersecurity knowledge and skills in the workforce and leadership have become apparent to top the list
of several human vulnerabilities in the minds of corporate decision makers, governments, and academic
researchers (Adams and Makramalla, 2015). These have been quite dominant in the list of successful attack
drivers in the industry. A study indicates that 20% of frightful security breaches in 2015 were attributed to
decisive misuse of infrastructure assets, and 31% due to human errors (IRM, 2015). Stolen credentials through
phishing accounts for 80% of data breaches (Debo, 2015). Spear Phishing attacks have also topped security
concerns for enterprises, accounting for an average loss of $1.6 million, impacting loss of employee
productivity (43%), financial losses (32%), damage to company reputation (29%), damage to brand reputation
(27%), and loss of intellectual property (25%) (CLOUDMARK, 2016). Such precarious situations continue to
press on industries and organisations due to a lack of inadequate understanding of the security capacities of
operational workforce, and failure to provide operational staff (humans) with effective and up-to-date
cybersecurity knowledge and skills capability to defend against cyber-attacks (Ashford, 2016).
These records suggest that despite any huge investments in technology security solutions to safeguard ICSs,
human-factored security characteristics still play very significant roles towards achieving a holistic cyber
security posture and assurance. These records and their implications to overall security within the ICS
environment clearly support the motivation to explore potential solutions. Knowledge and skills security
characteristics are particularly important. The statistics further suggest that the value of an organisation’s chief
security asset is more in its people – human constituents (workforce), than in technologies or laws and
regulations (Navarro, 2007), and also points to humans as being potentially the weakest links (Kaspersky-
Labs, 2015) in the ICS operation chain. The success of any security venture is eventually dependent upon the
human element – people are both the most significant resource and potentially the major threats to security
(PA Consulting Group, 2015). Eventually, a system or an organisation is as weak as its weakest link asset
(Russell, 2002; Navarro, 2007). In the ICS environment, these weak links are characterised by industrial
control system personnel, such as operators, technicians, experts, and enterprise/corporate users, whose
population often outnumber the population in a security and non-security-oriented classification of the
workforce (Robert, 2015). These people are typically unfamiliar with digital security concepts, and less keen
about the importance of cybersecurity trends and practices, but more on operational performance trends (PA
Consulting Group, 2015). This often puts greater demand/responsibility for assuring security on a relatively
fewer numbered cybersecurity professionals, compounding their workload. The volumes, variety, and target
multi-directivity of attacks patterns also down-plays the capability of cybersecurity professionals to directly
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security-savvy ICS workforce seem to be predominantly targeted than the security experts. The former often
lack adequate skill capacity for effective response, and sometimes lack updated knowledge as well. Thus,
cybersecurity knowledge and practical security response skills are two key attributes of workforce security
capability, considered invaluable for achieving a secure industrial operating environment. However, the
effective input of security knowledge and skills should be built on; a clear understanding of existing measures
of capability, and the identification of capability shortfalls that reveal user vulnerabilities (weaknesses) to
cyber attackers. This can only be achieved through evaluations.
A human-involved approach is required to supplement existing technical-based security approaches towards
an overall cyber security assurance. Badie and Lashkari (2012) categorised the factors that affect the security
of computing systems into two: (i) human factor and, (ii) organization factor. According to the researchers,
earlier works indicated that of these two categories, the human factor seemed the most important. A human-
factored security endeavour is required that can improve the capabilities of the operational technology human
constituents, so that they can appropriately recognise and respond to cyber intrusion events within the ICS
environment. Quantitative analysis could provide an easy approach to evaluating the security capability of a
user in relations to cyber-attacks, as it can help both senior managers and general infrastructure users to
intuitively understand the status of their cybersecurity capability. Quantitative approach also simplifies result
presentation and interpretations. Quantitative approaches allow for consistent results, the production of trend
interpolations and forecasts, quicker situational understanding for decision-making, and the further
representation of results in better understood formats like charts, graphs, and tables for time-critical decision-
making. These are necessary to improve security posture and assurance within the industrial operating
environment, without which top management is unable to retain high degrees of confidence about the security
of their industrial asset (Evans et al., 2016).
3. Related Works
The assessment of cyber security capability of human agents (workforce) is quite helpful towards achieving
an efficient workforce security consciousness (Navarro, 2007). There are few researches which explored this
area to propose schemes for assessing cybersecurity postures from the workforce perspectives.
A Human Factor Vulnerability Analysis (HFVA) framework is presented by Kraemer & Carayon (Kraemer
and Carayon, 2003). The framework presents a three-stage process (identification, analysis, and solution) for
determining human-factor vulnerabilities connected to technical vulnerabilities. The framework is presented
as a process that follows a system/network-wide technical audit conducted after the discovery of technical
vulnerabilities that bear human-factor underpinning. The HFVA model is limited in that it depends on the
existence of technical vulnerabilities, and evaluates how well human network administrative experts are able
to classify and appropriate respond to technical security vulnerabilities. Thus, it assumes human-factor
vulnerabilities to be solely dependent on technical vulnerabilities. This is not entirely true with changing attack
patterns, where social engineering attacks forms are employed to exploit and compromise systems and
networks even when clear technical vulnerabilities have not been identified. The human agent itself is an asset
that can have exploitable vulnerabilities, and can be independent of any technical vulnerabilities.
Human agents with varied levels of knowledge and experience in cyber security can demonstrate different
perceptions of cyber security. Typically, higher security proficiencies imply better capability as experience
can influence decision-making capability levels (Asgharpour, Liu and Camp, 2007). Advanced knowledge and
previous experience could enhance the sensitivity to security threats and the performance of incident response.
The researchers in (Goodall, Lutters and Komlodi, 2009) highlighted that domain knowledge in information
and network security, as well as situated environmental knowledge grounded in an analyst’s unique
environment; are required to boost the expertise for effective intrusion detection by an analyst. The domain
knowledge includes: theoretical knowledge acquired through formal education, training, or certification (Chi,
2006), and practical knowledge cultured through hands-on practice and experience with tools, methods of
operation, and work- flows. The situated environmental knowledge is acquired through continued interactions
with a specific operating environment (Goodall, Lutters and Komlodi, 2004). Researchers have used interviews
and questionnaires to drive easy understanding of both mental models and security workforce workflows
(D’Amico and Whitley, 2008; Paul and Whitley, 2013).
Wang (2013) explored an assessment of cyber security knowledge and behaviour using an anti-phishing
scenario. The study investigated the relationship between evaluated users’ knowledge of cyber security risks
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security solution. The outcome showed a positive correlation which implied that the extent of security
knowledge influenced the attitude and intention towards adopting cybersecurity solutions. Another significant
finding indicated a positive correlation between direct assessment answers and self-assessment responses.
Wang (2013) also recommended security training and assessment tools surveys and questionnaires.
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (CCMM) (Christopher et al., 2014) describes an assessment
framework, consisting of a set of characteristics, indicators or patterns that embody capability and progression
which can be contextualised to various disciplines. CCMM provides a flexible guide to help organisations
establish and enhance their security capability using corporate-level abstractions. More common studies focus
on the impacts of human perception (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010; Siponen, Adam Mahmood and
Pahnila, 2014), attitudes, and behaviour (Parsons et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2016) to organisational security
capacities, and policy implementations. These works have emphasised the relevance of social human attributes
to effective security outcomes and performances. While these attributes are quite relevant and influential in
deriving security conclusions in terms of capacities and controls, security knowledge and skill levels of
individuals can influence the outcome of each attribute. Thus, it is rational to consider the primary influencing
factors and how they impact resulting security capacities and controls.
Beautement et al (2016) argued that effective security management required that security managers were able
to evaluate the effectiveness of prescribed policies, as well as the impact of employee behaviour. They
proposed a Productive Security (ProdSec) methodology for aggregating huge datasets on employee behaviour
and attitudes using scenario-based surveys. The approach was designed to ensure repeatable and scalable data
collection, from which better insights can be deduced about security-related issues facing employees, their
response behaviours, and attitudes. Results indicated that that business area, age, and geographical location,
all provide axis of differentiating response maturity levels of employees, as well as intra-population group of
employees. Details as these can influence efficient planning of future trainings, communications, and policy-
making. It can also support proactive targeted interventions (remediation) on specific employees, which can
save from inclusions in non-targeted interventions and reduce the expense on employee compliance budgets
(Beautement, Sasse and Wonham, 2009).
Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015) investigated the security capacity differences between security experts and
novices within an organisational setup. The study evaluated the expertise of cyber security analysts with
specific application to intrusion detection, and the use of intrusion detection systems (IDS). Using emulated
scenarios, the researchers used the IDS response approach to evaluate the general performance of both expert
and novice security analysts outside conventional operational environments. The outcome showed that experts
performed slightly than novices. Results also suggested that theoretical knowledge as being completely
independent of practical knowledge. The dissociation was more noticeable in the expert analysts’ group than
in the novice group.
Generally, the use of quantitative tools and measures of performance relating to intrusion detection scenarios
provided an effective means of evaluating and characterising security control capacities of the expert groups
as desired (Ben-Asher and Gonzalez, 2015). Quantitative analysis could provide an easy approach to
evaluating the security capability of a user in relations to cyber-attacks, as it can help both senior managers
and general infrastructure users to intuitively understand the status of their cyber security capability. A
quantitative approach also simplifies result presentation and interpretations. Quantitative approaches allow for
consistent results, the production of trend interpolations and forecasts, quicker situational understanding for
decision-making, and the further representation of results in better understood in formats like charts, graphs,
and tables for time-critical decision-making. These are necessary to improve security capacity and assurance
within the industrial operating environment, and without which top management is unable to retain high
degrees of confidence about the security of their industrial asset (Evans et al., 2016). This work provides the
baseline for our research and contribution.
Some clear points picked from the above reviews include security capabilities can be evaluated through
interviews (structured and semi-structured) (D’Amico et al., 2005), questionnaires (Botta et al., 2007),
observations and gamifications (Paul and Whitley, 2013; Adams and Makramalla, 2015; Ben-Asher and
Gonzalez, 2015), penetrations testing (Aloul, 2012), etc. While a body of works exists around understanding
the security posture of organisations, there is little research that has proffered a clear quantitative scheme for
evaluating and attributing security capacities to individuals within an organisation, and use such individual
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wide dispositions rather than workforce-focused dispositions.
Cyber security knowledge and practical security response skills are two direct attributes of workforce security
capability which are invaluable towards achieving a secure industrial operating environment. These can be
quite distinct as well. However, the effective input of security knowledge and skills should be built on; a clear
understanding of existing measures of capability, and the identification of capability shortfalls that reveal user
vulnerabilities (weaknesses) to cyber attackers. This can be achieved through evaluations. Existing researches
on security performance evaluation of human agents within organisations typically focused on comparative
analysis of security perceptions, with emphasis the security staff (analysts) who had the duty of securing a
system. There is no research on other operational human agents such as found in the ICS domain and their
performance and contribution to overall system security. We have not yet seen research in identifying potential
workforce’s weakest links, potential weak security capability areas, and the discrete but informative adoption
of security measures. This work will fill the gaps.
4. Proposed Evaluation Model
The lack of familiarity with digital security concepts observed in ICS workforce opens a great deal of security
vulnerabilities that could be easily exploited through social engineering by intelligent intruders. These
adversaries exploit human characteristics and attitudes, such as ignorance, desire for gain, rewards, being
helpful and responsible to coax actions, and (or) inactions from targeted workforce, to enable non-resistant
access to systems and infrastructures, which could otherwise yield resistance when and if accessed directly.
The number and capability of organisation-resident cybersecurity professionals, who have responsibility for
system security in an enterprise is typically inadequate to completely protect the organisation. Every single
ICS OT personnel presents an equal access point to the ICS, and the defence capacity of each ICS personnel
contributes to an overall security status.
4.1 Security Capability
In this study, workforce security capability is considered as the combined, normalised, and (or) harmonised
expression of security proficiencies in knowledge (domain and situational) and practical skills of a human
agent (user) for appropriate actions, reactions, and (or) inactions for effective security of operational systems.
Thus, industrial workforce security capability is modelled in terms of their knowledge and skill levels. These
two attributes are considered as dominant factors in the security proficiency of operators in the ICS
environment. Security knowledge level is defined as the measure of theoretical information that an individual
has about cyber threats, vulnerabilities, attack patterns and impacts on a host system. Skill level outlines the
ability to use accrued hands-on techniques and(or) tools to detect or recognise cyber-attack attempts, patterns
and techniques, and to respond timely with appropriate countermeasures. Knowledge and skills in digital
security concepts, evolving threats, vulnerabilities, attack intelligence, and the practical security response skills
of each ICS personnel, allow a better understanding of the inherent security level of the entire workforce in an
industry enterprise. This will help create the essential threshold of organisational security.
ICS workforce typically include IT security experts, IT operations personnel, and OT personnel (field
operators, automation engineers, SCADA and telemetry engineers, corporate management, etc). All of them
contribute directly and (or) indirectly, actively or passively in control system process activities, and their
individual security capabilities contribute directly and indirectly to the threshold of general workforce security
capacity. The threshold of general workforce security capability refers to the harmonised security status-
derivative in relations to all evaluated workforce security capabilities in the organisation. Thus, the
commitment of workforce to protecting an organisation and operational infrastructure is a critical factor of a
strong cybersecurity defence. The approach of appraising and enhancing workforce cybersecurity capabilities
as a means of emphasising a positive security culture is necessary. As knowledge levels indicate the degree
of awareness to potential cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, attacks patterns, and damaging impacts, the
evaluation of knowledge seeks to verify if, and how much an individual is acquainted with prevailing ICS
security trends and intelligence in a specific working environment. It is an attempt to ascertain (and to what
degree) if the industrial workforce knows what to do, and (or) what not to do to guard against successful
breaches from cyber-attacks.
In contrast, skill levels can help build the ICS personnel some degree of practical social and technical strengths
for hands-on, efficient and appropriate actions and reactions to potential security attacks, such that industry
workforce is able to prevent cyber-attacks or mitigate attack impacts. Thus, cybersecurity capability evaluation
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confidentiality, and accountability. Assessment scopes should cover typical areas such as personnel security
responsibilities, prevalent attack patterns, signatures, and appropriate response modes, adherence to adopted
security policies, standards, and best practice solutions, samples of ICS security failures and impacts, updated
security threat and vulnerability intelligence, and observed/discovered capability gaps in individual personnel,
security initiative, and adherence to global standards (Parsons et al., 2010; PA Consulting Group, 2015).
4.2 The Weakest Link
The statistics enumerating the successes of cyber incidents influenced by the ability of attackers to easily con
human actors to behave or respond inappropriate to attack and compromise scenarios within their work
domains add to the evidence that suggests that human actors are potentially the weakest links (Ashford, 2016).
Clearly, all other things being equal including well instituted technical security measures, the record of cyber
incidents described in section 2 also demonstrate facts that intelligent attackers motivated by potential financial
gains tend to direct their malicious effort toward less-protected targets (Pan, Zhong and Mei, 2015). The
attackers aim to compromise potential targets (human actors) with poor or weak abilities to defend
infrastructure and information systems from attacks. “The weakest link” refers to the most poorly protected
asset. “The weakest link” asset has become a key factor to determine the security level of the chain. If these
corporations want to improve the security level of the whole information systems and optimize security chain
integration, they must improve the security level of “the weakest link” (Pan, Zhong and Mei, 2015) . The
question left to be answered remains; how to find the weakest link?
An attempt to address this is demonstrated in a previous work (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016) from a human-factor
security perspective. An approach is proffered for identifying the weakest link in security capability of ICS
human workforce. ‘Humans’, also referred to as ‘workforce’, often present the weakest link in an operational
security chain (Mitnick and Simon, 2003), and an organisation security capacity is as weak as its weakest link.
Understanding workforces’ security capabilities inferred from knowledge and skill measures, deriving a
workforce-focused organisational security posture, and the identification of specific most vulnerable
workforce constituents (weakest link) in the system are important for evaluating an overall ICS security posture
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010; Aloul, 2012; Pan, Zhong and Mei, 2015). A weakest link refers to
the personnel with least knowledge and practical proficiency in security for the implementation of ICS security
objectives. Essentially, the weakest link is the least security-capable individuals in the operational domain,
who demonstrate the highest likelihood of becoming victims of cybersecurity attacks (Aloul, 2012;
Vishwanath, 2016). Such human elements represent the easiest attack vectors, and provide the weakest
penetrable entry point to a system irrespective of whatever other safeguards in place. Identifying these weakest
points through evaluation presents an essential line of action towards security assurance. Identifying and
strengthening weakest links is equivalent to raising the bar of security capability of an organisational
workforce. This work explores further this concept of human security capability evaluation (Ani, He and
Tiwari, 2016), and proposes a quantitative approach to characterising workforce security capability, and
identifying potential weak-links in an ICS operational domain. It also explores how the security weaknesses
of the workforce members can influence the implementation of a priority-driven control strategy.
4.3 The Model
As an extension of prior work on human cybersecurity capability evaluation (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2016) where
organisational security level is derived from the combined average for knowledge and skills security capacity
for all human actors within an evaluation context. Further research has proffered more clarity and rational
against initial assumptions that capabilities in individuals are interdependent such that average values can be
used to represents a harmonised overall security capacity. It is more rationale to view each user as independent
and a potential entry point into the system irrespective of the presence of others. Thus, an improvement in the
weakest link attribute is introduced to the capability evaluation process where harmonised security capability
ratings implicitly express measures of weakness or susceptibility to attacks. The collection of varied values in
a set of capability ratings is indicative of the varied, independent susceptibilities or weak points that can allow
successful cyber-attacks. The multiplicity of capability values indicates the variety of potential attack surfaces,
and implies the multiplicity of corresponding human vulnerability weak-points for possible initiation and (or)
accomplishment of cyber-attacks. In a set of capability rating scores, higher values suggest higher defensive
surfaces and lesser vulnerable surfaces in relations to a defined security baseline, and vice versa.
The concept of security defence combined with vulnerability baselines, and the quantitative representation
could support easy and clear identification, articulation, and attribution of potential weak-links. The least
9capability value together with its corresponding vulnerability rating suggests the most vulnerable surface, and
points to an associated human actor (user) with the greatest likelihood of successfully falling for a human-
factor cyber-attack event. Hence, represents the weakest link. The new evaluation scheme presents a five-stage
activity process of evaluating workforce cybersecurity capability, which include: definition, data collection,
formulation, representation, and attribution as presented in Figure 1. Each stage provides a list of sub-stages,
which form an overall security capability evaluation of ICS workforce.
4.3.1 Definition
This involves the definition of knowledge and skills security capability requirements, and the outline of
desirable security capability baselines.
A. Security requirements
Workforce security evaluation should be built upon defined security policies and requirements, compliant with
relevant standards and best practices, and contextual objectives of the specific operational environment. There
exist several standards focusing on security in the ICSE, most of which are domain-specific, and do not cover
all ICS types, security functionalities and requirements. For instance, the UK ‘10 Steps to Cyber Security’
guideline (UK-Cabinet-Office, 2012), NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 - guidance on security and privacy controls
for systems and organisations (NIST, 2013), NIST SP 800-82 Revision 2 - guide on industrial control system
security, etc., all have sections that advise on requirements and guidelines regarding personnel security
awareness and training. Combining recommendations from these standards can provide a better reference for
situational security requirements to guide capability evaluations considering the specific features of the
system/environment under consideration.
B. Security Baseline
Security baseline defines desirable the status of the metrics/measures, representing varied capabilities and their
corresponding attribute ratings from security requirements. It can be considered as the point of ideal
capabilities of all workforce members. Any status lower than this ideal capability is considered a non-ideal
capability.
In the proposed model, a capability ratio is introduced with value range of [0, 1]. We adopt the FIPS 199
(NIST, 2004) security categorisation recommendations to define three levels of capabilities: low, moderate,
and high levels. For this, a three-group ratio is defined where a one-step incremental ratio is used to derive
respective upper bounds: 1/3, 2/3, and 3/3 for the three levels (low, moderate, and high) within the defined
range 0-1 as earlier prescribed. The capability ranges for the three groups/levels of classification are presented
in Table 1. This capability ratio is used to provide capability categorisations for which the workforce and their
associated capability evaluation values that would be classified. This way, human agent security capacities are
grouped according to closely related scores/ratings to indicate the personnel that share similar of very close
capability traits and proficiencies, and to support better decision-making on appropriate responses.
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Figure 1: Human Workforce Security Capability Evaluation Scheme
This is not adopted as a closed scheme, but rather, it represents a way of achieving categorisations for security
capabilities. Following a similar approach, other grouping schemes may be adopted with a t-level
categorisation, where t can be 2, 3, 4, or 5, and defining the number of capability categorisation desired from
an evaluation scheme. Depending on the value of t, the number of PSC, ratio, fractional limits, capability range,
and priority ratings would be proportionate to t, and will corresponding number of classifications to represent
dispersed or closely-related security capacities of human agents under evaluation. For instance, if t=5, it means
5-level classification is used. Upper bounds for the classes include; 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5, which is still
between 0 and 1. The values for capability variables (knowledge and skills) will then be spread among the 5
groups. In comparison with t=3, using t=5 will imply that workforce capabilities are classed into 5 groups
instead of 3. The 3 groups will break off to form independent groups to make up the 5 groups. The implication
is that the specific capability value for each workforce would remain unchanged since the same range [0,1] is
used, and the evaluation tool (questionnaire) characteristics (questions, multichoice answers and score
allocations) also remain unchanged. Only the values’ classification in capability range and priority ranking
may change. The capability ratings are applied to knowledge, skills, and harmonised capability metrics
accordingly, and the range is used for ranking the level of workforce capabilities. A priority order for security
response/control is defined which is the reverse order of the security capability levels for security arrangement.
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Table 1: Capability - Priority Range Table
Capability Rating Capability Range
Priority Rating
(Security Response)
Low (l) 0 ≤ l ≤   
 
High
Moderate (m)  
 
 ˂ m ≤   
 
 
Moderate
High (h)  
 
 ˂ h ≤ 1 Low
4.3.2 Data Collection Methods and Tools
To determine the status of an entity in the light of prescribed security requirements, it is necessary to extract
the information of the entity. It is pertinent for the workforce security capacity evaluation to aggregate the data
of the response or reactions of ICSE workforce members to cyber threats, attacks and/or incidents through
active and/or passive, direct and/or indirect security capability investigation. The investigation should reflect
prescribed ICSE security policy guidelines, objectives, evaluation timeline, a targeted workforce size, and
quality of expected feedback.
For this evaluation, the test-based questionnaire tool is used for data collection following similar approaches
observed in related literatures. This approach is typically used to determine if a tested subject qualifies in
relations to certain prescribed standards as in this case; the UK Cyber Security Essentials (10 Steps to Cyber
Security). Feedback data are collected and characterised to clearly represent attributes of individuals in the
evaluated group. Score ratings are attributed based on the coded response/feedbacks in relations to the
organisation’s view of the security risk implications of each response to the security objectives. These
quantitative feedback data then serve as inputs to the computation stage of the evaluation model.
4.3.3 Formulation
At this stage, mathematical procedures are applied on collected data to determine possible workforce capability
values. Following the description of workforce security capability as a function of security knowledge and
skills of a workforce, two groups of data corresponding to security knowledge and skills evaluations are
derived.
Assuming p is an element in set P of ICS workforce personnel, whose security capacity will be evaluated, and
N implies the total number of members in the set. Depending on the evaluation technique, let K = {k1, k2,…,
kN} represents the set of evaluation questions (from capability data collection tool which can be a survey) for
knowledge capability. Every element in K contains a multi-choice list of evaluation (survey) response options
each having a corresponding score allocation based on expert judgment on the implications of the choice to an
overall assurance of security of the ICS. A response knowledge score allocation (x) range of 1 to 5 is proposed,
1 implying a lower potential and 5 implying a higher potential of resistance to the prescribed security scenario.
Each response to an element in K therefore has a value range: {x| 1≤ x ≤5}. The variety of feedbacks in K will
yield varied occurrence of x during the data aggregation. Hence, the cumulative knowledge capacity (CKC)
for every p ∈ P, as the measure of the total quantitative knowledge capability (Kc) scores of a single workforce
member. This is represented in equation 1. Note that equation 1 represents the computational model for
deriving the security knowledge capability score of a single workforce (human agent) obtained from the score
allocations associated to the individual’s responses in the evaluation tool.
    =      = 	   ( .  ) 
   
 
 
, ∀	  ∈  															(1)
where nx is the number of occurrences of respective response allocation x (i.e., 1-5)
Similarly, the cumulative skill capability (CSC) of   ∈  	can also be derived from a set S of skills capability
evaluation questions (from capability data collection tool which can be a survey), using similar scheme and
range for skill score (y) as in knowledge score (x), i.e. 1-5. The total quantitative skill capability (Sc) rating of
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a single workforce member p can be denoted as equation 2. This represents the computational model for deriving the
security skill capability score of a single workforce (human agent) also obtained from the score allocations associated to
the individual’s responses in the evaluation tool.
    =      = 	     .    
   
 
 
, ∀	  ∈  															(2)
Equations 1 and 2 can be used to compute corresponding knowledge and skill capabilities of each workforce
member p in the group P of the workforce under evaluation. The harmonisation of Kc and Sc values yields a
personalised security capability (PSC) computed via a Geometric Mean (GM) technique of the knowledge and
skills capability score associated with a single individual. This is presented as Equation 3. GM offers the
strength of being less submissive to the vast skewness influence of a very large values in a range of distribution
(Manikandan, 2011), through normalising quantities to ensure that no singular quantity alone perpetually
dominates the weighing of a final result. A set of PSCs will be generated, corresponding to all members,   ∈
 , and fed into the representation stage of the evaluation process.
     = 	      × 		          , ∀	  ∈  																	(3)
4.3.4 Representation
The visualisation of workforce capacity should drive easy and better understanding of security perspectives, especially
by top management and decision-makers who are often less technically savvy. To achieve this visualisation, Capability
Placement Chart (CPC) and Capability Priority Table (CPT) are proposed as effective methods that can be used as shown
in Figure 2 (a) and (b), respectively.
The CPC embodies a scattered diagrammatic representation and placement of a set of derived PSC values. The
values would typically be between the potential minimum and maximum capability ratings for the group of
workforces, and which depict the status of security capacity for workforce members evaluated. High capability
value would mean a high knowledge and skills potentials with respect to outlined security baseline. A range
of priorities attributed to each PSC outline the magnitude of security attention and concern that should be
attributed to each PSC value in line with the capability-priority rating range outlined in Table 1. The order of
priority for security control effort is in the reverse order of security capacity. Workforce members with high
PSC values retain a relatively high degree of security awareness and practical proficiencies, implying a higher
likelihood to respond appropriately to potential security incidents, at least within the scope defined in the
evaluation tool. PSC values that fall within the moderate capability ratings imply a moderate priority rating,
and those within the low capability rating imply a high priority rating. These particularly indicate low level
security awareness and (or) skills, and thus a higher need for security control measures that can improve their
capacities to an acceptable level and within the prescription of the evaluation objectives.
The CPT presents PSC values alongside corresponding Kc and Sc values; helping to provide a holistic detail
and comparative provisioning for the evaluation process. It provides a means of easily identifying both initial
and successive weakest links in an array of PSC values. In the case where further or deeper insights are required
about each metric or the harmonised format, capability priority table also provides a means for the optional
analysis of derive measures using conventional statistical paradigms, such as measures of central tendency and
dispersion. It can also support a test of hypothesis where necessary to compare or consolidate on findings and
conclusion from initial evaluation results.
13
Figure 2: Capability Representation Formats
The interpretation of result involves a contextualised mental clarification of the significance of the results in
the representation stage. This tie real meanings and implications to derived quantities and measures in both
knowledge and skills evaluations in relations to security threats, vulnerabilities, attacks capability gaps in the
ICS workforce. Such interpretations simplify the understanding of the points of high risk, the scale of risks
and potential impacts from workforce perspective. It contributes to an understanding of what is expected of
workforce members towards an overall operations security of ICS.
4.3.5 Attribution
This involves the clear identification of the weakest link attribute to a relative workforce member or group in
line with a prescribed attribute function. In the approach proposed, the weakest link attribute implies the
workforce or group with the least possible capability rating value and highest possible priority rating value in
the capability priority table (CPT). The focus is typically on the PSC array, however, depending on the targeted
objective, Kc and Sc arrays can also be used to attribute weakest link. Assuming Z represent the set of PSC
values in the CPT, the weakest link (WL) attribute can be determined with simple mathematical minimum
function as;
   = 	   ( ) (3)
The characterisation of the weakest link also guides the process of determining the specific security
vulnerabilities demonstrated by workforce members, and potential control solutions as a means of remediating
identified capability gaps. The results and inferences from the evaluation process gives an understanding of
the security incidence response and control measures that can be engaged. This typically tilts towards security
capability areas where workforce members demonstrate a low degree of knowledge and skills.
5 Scenario-Based Testing
A scenario-based testing and validation technique is used to explore the usability and workability of the
proposed approach.
5.1 Evaluation Tool (Survey) Design
An online questionnaire evaluation tool is adopted as a means towards achieving scalable collections of
evaluation data. The reason for this validation was to assess the suitability of the proposed method for
achieving efficient quantitative evaluations of ICSE workforce cybersecurity capability. To ascertain its
effectiveness towards the identification of; potential weakest link(s), predominant security vulnerability areas,
and relevant control measures. The defined security objectives for the assessment included: (i) evaluate the
knowledge and skills security capability of the industrial workforce in relations to prescribed security guides,
(ii) ascertain the weakest link from computed workforce personalised security capability values, and (iii)
identify possible weak capability security themes and control areas in the workforce.
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The purpose for adopting an online questionnaire approach was to efficiently reach large numbers of industrial
workforce respondents, while allowing for participation in the assessment from any geographical location.
This way, the demand constraints for participation is reduced, and response rates likelihoods potentially
increased. It was also meant to create more realistic unsupervised assessment scenarios that will yield realistic
data collection. The assessment questionnaire was circulated via email links to forum members of the UK IoT
Security Foundation. It was opened to those who shared concerns about human-factor security vulnerabilities,
and desired a way of determining specific security capabilities of respective workforce member within their
industrial organisations, to support security decision-making. The evaluation contents shared contained clear
description of the security capability evaluation questionnaire and its purpose.
In line with the model approach proposed, the evaluation was made following some recommended security
control attributes and requirements for enabling cyber-attack defence, effective security within a digital system
like ICS, as contained in NIST SP 800-82 v2 (Stouffer et al., 2015), and UK 10 steps to Cybersecurity (UK-
Cabinet-Office, 2012) good practice guide. Specific areas considered include: privacy and access control,
system/network security monitoring, user awareness and training, secure configurations, removable media
protection, personnel/credential security, home and mobile security, email security, malware protection,
incident response, updates and patch management.
5.2 Capability Evaluation Tool (Survey) Testing and Refining
Survey questions were designed to evaluate the level of respondents’ knowledge and skills in relations to the
above-listed security themes. The broad security themes outlined in 5.1 also reflected similar security focus
areas enumerated by Parson et al (2014) that provide valid themes for evaluating human aspect of information
security. Questions were designed in scenario-based formats to evaluate the level of respondents’ knowledge
and skills in relations to these varied security theme. Initial assumptions included that the workforce members
involved already had prior awareness and guidance on adherence to the prescribed security guides and
essentials. The assessment was thus to ascertain the extent to which workforce members are holding up or
improving on the security knowledge and skills already imparted by organisations. In structuring the questions,
the design objectives were to: (i) present realistic and familiar security scenarios to participants, and (ii) proffer
answer options that are realistic and familiar to the participants.
The initial evaluation tool (survey) comprised of two sets of questions covering knowledge and skills
respectively. Each set comprised of 30 questions (3 questions per security theme) and focused on direct
evaluations of security capability via applying the proposed model. Each question had 5 multiple-choice
answers. This initial survey tool was subjected to quality testing using one-to-one interviews with 3 cyber
security professionals (2 IT security experts and 1 ICS security expert) not included in the general capability
evaluation sample. The inputs from experts were used to evaluate the validity and reliability of the survey tool
in relations to its representativeness of all the security themes adopted in 5.1. Each expert answered questions
relating to: if the survey tool was measuring what is intended, i.e., workforce security knowledge and skills. If
the questions captured all the security themes of interest? If there was a need to add or cut down on questions,
and rank the 3 questions in each security theme according to relevance. Each expert was to revise (where
necessary) and provide ranking score allocations to the multiple-choice answers in each question based on the
expert’s perceived severity or implication of each response to an overall cyber-attack susceptibility.
In response to recommendations from the expert on the survey evaluations, significant and necessary
improvements were achieved. The number of questions for each security theme was reduced to 2 for both the
knowledge and skills sets. For each security theme, the top two most relevant questions identified by experts
were selected. This reduced the number of questions in each set from 30 to 20. Following expert
recommendations, a third set (comprising of 6 questions) was introduced to capture additional respondent
demographic data (gender, age, work group, and possession of security certification) and a security self-
evaluation rating. Score allocations for each of the multiple-choice answers were obtained by taking the
average of the scores for each choice allocated by the experts. Where there were ties, further interaction was
engaged with the experts to understand their viewpoints and use that to resolve score allocation ties amongst
choice answers.
Thus, the capability evaluation tool (survey) output of this testing yielded 3 sets of questions: set A for
respondents’ demographics and self-evaluations (6 questions), set B for respondents’ security knowledge
evaluations (20 questions), and set C for security skills evaluations (20 questions). Each question in sections
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B and C has 5 multiple-choice answers with respective score allocations, corresponding to the perceived
severity or implication of each answer to an overall cyber-attack susceptibility and potential risk posed. The
accompanying multi-choice answers is to represent varied security susceptibility levels (from high to low) for
a respondent. The score allocation range is from 1 to 5, where an answer that implies a least security implication
has a highest score of 5, while that with a highest implication has a least score of 1. A respondent’s (knowledge
or skills) capability is inferred from the choice answer for every question by the respondent.
The revised evaluation tool was pilot-tested with a team of six researchers at the manufacturing informatics
centre in Cranfield University undertaking a research project for the development of a similar physical
demonstrator of cyber security in manufacturing. The pilot test was built on the assumption: (i) the team
represents a small-scale industrial (manufacturing) workforce, (ii) all the members of the team had equal action
potentials to ensure the attainment of prescribed objectives of the project. The revised evaluation tool was
administered to each team member and responses analysed using the workforce capability evaluation approach.
The corresponding knowledge and skills capability ratings were derived using the appropriate evaluation
functions as prescribed in the model. For this, the capability priority rankings include: 20.00 ≤ h ≤ 33.33 for
high, 33.33 < m ≤ 66.67 for moderate, and 66.67 < l ≤ 100.00 for low. The low priority range of scores
represented the ‘Ideal state’ I of the metric quantities. The evaluation yielded different levels of capabilities
for knowledge, skills, and normalised capability ratings for the team members. The evaluation provided
quantitative value reflections of the team members security capabilities, from which the weakest link can be
identified. Based on the model description, the weakest link capability is attributed to the team member ID
WF03 (Kc = 23, and Sc = 48) with a normalised capability rating CR = 33.23. A further look into the
demographic profile of WF03: not having any form of security certification, product development process
designer (not belonging to a security workgroup), and not having any form of work experience; all combine to
suggest an element of true representation of the security state of the weakest link in comparison with others in
the team.
The revised survey tool was again passed through the experts for another testing for quality in terms of
identifying poor question wording and ordering, as well as errors in rationale layout, multichoice answers and
associated score allocations to improve the quality and credibility of response and results. With minimal
alterations, the final evaluation tool was used for the actual evaluation with real external target audience.
Security knowledge capability survey was captured through structured questions that query respondent’s
awareness relative to their work environments and trends about certain threats, vulnerabilities, attacks or
control details or features. For example, the question below is one of the knowledge capability questions that
queries on ‘system/network monitoring’:
‘The risk of your industrial process/operational environment becoming a victim of a cyber-attack has
increased in the past year, and you are conscious of this while undertaking your routine duties in the
workplace. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?’
A. Totally agree [5]
B. Tend to agree [4]
C. Tend to disagree [3]
D. Totally disagree [2]
E. Don’t Know [1]
Rational for score allocations
The numbers represent the score allocation that represent the relative security capability effort for each of the
corresponding responses chosen. Employees who choose "E” are obviously unaware of the evolving industrial
security trends, and are least likely to notice or sense security anomalies on their work end, hence the least ‘1’
score allocation. Those who choose “D” are the next least likely sense security since they do not believe that
there is any security risk around their work place. Their score allocation is “2”, followed by those who choose
“C” with a “3” score allocation. However, the employees that chose “A” are most likely to notice or sense
security anomalies given their initial acknowledgment of proliferating attacks, hence, their score allocation of
“5” which implies a highest knowledge capability. This is followed by those who tend to agree, choosing “B”
with a “4” score allocations. Depending on the response chosen, the potential knowledge capability of the
respondent can easily be assumed.
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Security skills capability survey was captured through structured questions that query the practical actions or
reactions of respondents in the face certain cyber compromise conditions. For the skills example:
‘Outside the scheduled/planned maintenance period, you receive an email or pop-up notification on your
workstation to urgently initiate a ‘critical’ security update or patch that you are not sure has been tested but
addresses certain security flaws on your ICS node. How would you respond to this?’
A. Do not install the update/patch, and leave the security flaw [4]
B. Quickly install the update/patch to enhance the security of your ICS node. [2]
C. Test the acceptability of the patch yourself, and install when satisfied [3]
D. Seek and verify the approval and accountability for the update/patch from technical support [5]
E. Neither install or verify patch since your system is not breached and is working normal [1]
Rational for score allocations
Employees who choose "E” obviously bear careless security attitude, pose higher cyber-attack exposure, and
highly unlikely to respond appropriately to cyber-attacks. Those that choose “B” also retain significant
likelihood susceptibility to malware or Trojan attacks. Those that choose “D” might present the best likelihood
of reaching appropriate solution by their actions, as their actions can ensure proper verification and response.
Those with option “A” bear slight security risk, especially when the updates are genuine but ignored. for
appropriate and timely response to cyber-attack potential. Those with choice “C” offers a slight cyber-attack
risk doing the job themselves without formal reporting that could be helpful to others, but might proffer a
better and suitable operational solution for the company. Similarly, depending on the response chosen, the
potential skill capability of the respondent can easily be assumed.
Note that the score allocations are not directly included in the questionnaire, but only coded in the internal
setup, captured from responses and used to evaluate security capabilities after responses are collated. They are
only included here for clearer understanding of the evaluation scheme and process proposed. Table 2 presents
the summary of baseline definitions in line with earlier discussed capability classification ratios and groups. A
minimum capability rating is feasible assuming that all responses for one workforce member have the same
least allocation score of 1. A maximum capability rating is derivable if all the responses each have the highest
allocation score of 5. Response bias is a typical issue attributed to online surveys and questionnaires. It
exemplifies a phenomenon where respondents provide answers they consider most acceptable, or expected
from them, rather than a true expression of their personal views. To avert this, short and precise scenario-based
questions with close-ended Likert-style answers were used to avoid potentials response biases that can emerge
from too long and unclear questions. The interval scale (1-5) implied coding of responses was designed to help
the acquisition of more accurate responses. The answer options were mostly structured into short and concise
sentences to forestall the difficulty of evaluating their meanings by respondents. Response bias from
incomplete set of answers was resolved through introducing answer options. For example, the answer option
“Don’t Know” was used to cover other possible response options not included in the interval list, to avoid
getting ‘false-positive’ answers due to the absence of desirable options.
Table 2: Scenario Baseline Definitions
From Response Allocation Score, min = 20.00, and max = 100.00
Priority Class Range
Capability
Priority
Rankings
High Priority Range (h) 20.00 ≤ h ≤ 33.33 
Moderate Priority Range (m) 33.33 < m ≤ 66.67 
Low Priority Range (l) 66.67 < l ≤ 100.00 
5.3 Results Presentation
A total of 37 industrial professionals participated in the evaluation with each having a unique identifier. The
feedback data were collected and used to compute the knowledge, skills, and harmonised capabilities of
corresponding workforce members using Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
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A summarised capability-priority classification of the results is presented in Table 3. Figure 2 presents the
capability placement chart (CPC), and Table 4 presents the CPT of the first 15 least capability (highest priority)
ratings, while Figure 3 shows a chart showing the Kc, Sc, and PSC representations of the 15 least capability
(highest priority) workforce members.
5.3.1 Demographics and Reliability Testing Results
The ages of the respondents were grouped into three: Group 1 (20-35 years), Group 2 (36-50 years), and Group
1 (51-66 years). There were 18 respondents in Group 1, 18 in Group 2, and 1 respondent in Group 3. The
average age of the respondents was 36. More than half of the respondents (workforce) were between ages 30
and 40. More precisely, 48.6% of the sample workforce were under 35 years of age, and over three quarters
(91.9%) are under 45 years of age. These suggest that that most of workforce evaluated were mid-age range.
There were more male (33) than female (4) respondents, which suggests that there are potentially eight times
more male than female human workers in operational ICS domains. Similarly, there were more OT personnel
(34) than IT personnel (3), which provides an indication that that there are potentially more OT personnel than
IT in the ICSE.
Initial validity and internal consistency reliability test of the measurement scale for knowledge capability (Kc)
yielded Cronbach’s α = 0.868, which suggests a good measure of reliability. However, a good measure of 
reliability for the Skills capability (Sc) - Cronbach’s α = 0.803 was achieved in response to the need to remove 
one of the questions/assessment case items from the skills measurement scale. This item affected the reliability
of the scale, and needed to be excluded to achieve the minimum recommended level of reliability. A Pearson’s
r data analysis of the modified data revealed a low positive correlation, r = 0.018 between PSC and workforce
Age with significantly highly chances (0.914) of occurrence. This indicates a slight convergent validity, and
suggests that although workforce PSC and workforce Age were two separate constructs that measured distinct
properties about the workforce, there existed high likelihood of slight increase in PSC as Age increases. This
means that older industrial workforce personnel were more likely to be more knowledgeable and skilled in
security response and incident management in the ICSE. Possible influences on this correlation could be
attributed to years of experience working within the ICS domain and the corresponding incidents that may be
encountered, resolved, and learnt over the years.
The above results coincides with the findings by Beautement et al (2016) about a positive influence of Age on
employee security maturity levels. Other measures that indicated slightly positive correlations to PSC include:
Workforce Group with r = 0.130, and Capability Group with r = 0.416. The likelihoods of occurrence for both
measures were quite lower than that of Age. The results generally aligned with Wang’s (Wang, 2013)
conclusion of a positive correlations between directly evaluated (computational) and self-evaluated responses
of workforce security evaluations. This suggested that measures derived from directly evaluating capabilities
most often follows similar results pattern as measures from self-evaluated responses of the same workforce.
5.3.2 Direct Evaluation Results
As shown in Figure 4, results indicated only 3 (8.1%) respondents from the ‘security professional’ group, and
34 (91.9%) came from the ‘general ICS operations group’. This potentially reflects the typical rationing of
workforce members in the industrial environment, where there is by a greater proportion of the industrial
workforce, engaging general process operations, than that working for the maintenance of security. The result
of the normalised individual security capability scoring of sampled respondents, in line with the priority
grouping ratios prescribed in the capability evaluation model, indicates that more than half of the respondents
(23) representing 62.2% were classed to be of ‘low priority’ regarding their combined knowledge and skills
conforming to the prescribed security standards and best practices. 12 (32.4%) respondents fell onto the
‘moderate priority’, and 2 (5.4%) fell in the ‘high priority’ group. The latter group identifies the respondents
with high-risk weaknesses in cyber security, and which needed a quite urgent attention in terms of education
and security capacity building. Contextually, the weakest link (WL) typically emerges from this group, and is
attributed to the personnel with workforce ID WF014 with an approximate harmonised capability rating of
32.47 (  .  . ,   =    ( ) =    (     … 	    ) = 32.47). This workforce individual had a knowledge
capability rating of 34, and a skill capability rating of 31.
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Table 3: Capability-Priority Classification for Test Scenario
Cap. Priority Freq Percent ValidPercent
Cumm.
Percent
Low High 2 5.4 5.4 5.4
High Low 23 62.2 62.2 67.6
Moderate Moderate 12 32.4 32.4 100.0
Total 37 100.0 100.0
Figure 3: Workforce Capability Evaluation Placement Chart (37-User Classification)
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Table 4: Priority Ranking for the 15 workforce members with the lowest security capacity
WF ID Kc Sc PSC Priority Ratings
WF014 34 31 32.47 High
WF036 31 35 32.94 High
WF035 58 50 53.85 Moderate
WF023 64 48 55.43 Moderate
WF018 58 58 58.00 Moderate
WF037 60 60 60.00 Moderate
WF034 65 57 60.87 Moderate
WF019 66 57 61.34 Moderate
WF016 57 67 61.80 Moderate
WF032 71 54 61.92 Moderate
WF004 68 63 65.45 Moderate
WF028 70 62 65.88 Moderate
WF013 64 69 66.45 Moderate
WF002 59 75 66.52 Moderate
WF031 70 64 66.93 Low
Figure 1: 15 Lowest Capability Workforce Representation (Kc, Sc, and PSC Contributions)
In assessing the areas of potential security weaknesses inherent the workforce evaluated, the cumulative
capability rating (CCR) of each of the security questions was evaluated. The best-case scenario represents the
maximum CCR (CCRmax), with a value of 185, if the highest capability score of 5 is assigned by all workforce
responses to a specific question. The CCR value for the specific question is the product of the uniform score
and the number of respondents (i.e., 5 x 37 = 185). The worst case represents the minimum CCR (CCRmin),
which is 37 (i.e. representing the scenario where a uniform score of 1 is obtained by all responses to a specific
question). The 15 least CCR values are presented in Figure 5, the records indicate that the first 3 least CCRs
were from the skills evaluation questions, 10 (66.67%) of the least 15 CCRs compared came from the skills
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(Sc) evaluation questions (Table 5), and only 5 (33.33%) of the least 15 CCR values came from the knowledge
(Kc) questions (Table 6).
Table 5: The Least 10 Skills Cumulative Capability Ratings (CCR)
Skills Capability Weakness Areas
Question ID Questions Security Evaluation Areas
Q37: How often do you change/review your account password assuming
organisational security policy is in place
Credential (Password)
Management Policies
Q27: How do you respond to either of the following; the mouse on your
workstation screen begins to move around on its own and click things, or the
controls on your monitoring station (HMI) get activated on their own?
Malware (Virus) Attack
Response and Controls
Q23: How do you access and exchange files and documentations within your
industrial system/organisation (Enterprise Management and Industrial
networks)?
Removable Media
Protection
Q40: How often are you able to detect cyber intrusions, attacks, compromise, or
malware (virus, Trojan, spyware, etc.) when they occur on your work
system/station (industrial equipment, computing device, network, etc).
Malware (Virus) Attack
detection
Q30: Two different offices in your workplace are working to straighten out an
error in your Single Sign-On Account (Login) Configurations and Bank
payments details. Office 1 asks you to email your correct account details.
You send the requested details via email to office 1, which is subsequently
forwarded via email to office 2. Office 2 confirms to have straightened the
error out. What do you think could be wrong here?
Credential Management
and email security
Q22: How do you access and exchange files and documentations within your
industrial system/organisation (Enterprise Management and Industrial
networks)?
Updates and patch
management in ICS
Q28: In your opinion, which of these offers a stronger and more secure password
type to adopt?
Credential (password)
security deployment
Q34: It is festivity time; you receive an electronic greeting card (e-card) to your
work email from a friend. The mail requires you to click on the attachment
to view the electronic card. What should you do?
Email security (phishing)
attack management
Q24: Knowing and following the channels and modes for incident reporting in the
event of being a victim of a (suspected) cyber-attack/intrusion/infection. Incidence Response
Q29: Because you are keen on enhancing your cyber security knowledge and skills,
you subscribed to a number of free online ICS/SCADA Security Magazines.
To activate your free subscription, you are required to register with your
work email. One magazine asks for your year of birth, a second asks for your
month of birth, a third asks for your mother’s maiden name. How do you
respond to these queries?
Identity and Privacy
Security
Table 6: The Least 5 Knowledge Cumulative Capability Ratings (CCR)
Knowledge Capability Weakness Areas
Question ID Questions Security Evaluation Areas
Q1: How well secure do you feel about your industrial equipment, networks,
operations and(or) critical infrastructure against cyber vulnerabilities,
threats and attacks?
Security Controls
Availability
Q17: It is the sole responsibility of the information security department to protect
company assets by engineering protection and proper use of information
assets, deploying security technologies for securing industrial processes,
and developing proper security practices for daily activities
Proper Attribution of
Security Responsibilities
Q12: You have good knowledge and understanding of your duties and role
expectation pertaining the following; awareness and training, home and
mobile working, configuration management, removable media protection,
user credential security and management, incident response and
management, privacy controls, monitoring, malware protection, audits,
accountability, authentication and authorisation, physical and
environmental security, and contingency planning, for the protection of
industrial computing assets and critical infrastructures as contained in any
of (i) CPNI Good Practice Guide, (ii) ISO/IEC 27002, (iii) IEC 62443
(ISA-99), (iv) NIST SP 800-82 v2, (v) COBIT 5
Awareness of respective
Roles in Security
Q18: Which statement best describes your knowledge of potential solutions
available for addressing cyber security threats to ICS/SCADA infrastructure
and(or) enterprise network?
Knowledge of Available
security controls
Q2: How often do you monitor process and activity log data, and tune the usage
statistics of your Industrial Control Systems and IT critical infrastructure?
Security Monitoring
Frequency
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Furthermore, the demographics of WF014 personality indicates an age of 29, no form of certification in
information or cyber security, and self-rated assessment of security capability 1, which implies a least
capability rating. This suggests a relatively young age of work and perhaps experience, considering that three-
quarters of the workforce were over 30 years. Self-rated assessment of security capability is likely to change
as this personnel’s age and experience in the ICS environment increases.
The mean capability ratings for knowledge and skills are 69.43 and 62.97 respectively. The standard deviation
for the knowledge capability scores is 12.39, while that of the skill capability score is 11.69. In relations to the
security requirements adopted and evaluated, it implied that the workforce generally demonstrated higher
theoretical knowledge than practical skills. It could also be because of the perceived lack of keenness for
security skills in industrial workforce, who often assume that enforcing security should be solely left to the IT
security specialists. The standard deviation values indicated that there were slightly more capability
dispersions in security knowledge than security skill amongst the workforce. That is, most of the workforce
had very closely the same level of practical skills in ICS security than they were closely levelled in awareness
(knowledge) of ICS Security. In general, the results suggest some measure of capability gaps amongst the
workforce which may be influenced by their interactions, information sharing, personal capability
enhancement engagements, and possibly organisational policies on security. Out of the 37 workforce
members; 34 (91.9%) belonged to the General ICS operations class, 3 (8.1%) belong to ICS Security class. 36
(97.3%) did not have any security training or certificate, only 1 (2.7%) has a form of security training. This
reflects the potential typical rationing of workforce members in the industrial environment. There is by far a
greater proportion of the industrial workforce engaged with other industrial responsibilities other than the
maintenance or assurance of security.
5.3.3 Self-Evaluation Results
In the aspect of self-evaluated capabilities, more than half (19) or (62.2%) rated themselves as ‘low capability’
in ICS security proficiencies. This contrasts with the computed capability score class that showed 2 (5.4%)
respondents under low capability. This suggests a significant variation between individual and organisational
views about security capability expectations, and further suggest that the respondents appear to have a higher
capability rating disposition than that adopted by the organisation (used in the evaluation). To investigate and
expound further on this capability variations, statistical hypothesis testing was applied with a Null assertion
(A/Ho): There is no difference in priority rating levels of the workforce amongst the self-rated security
capability groups. The self-rated security capability attributes used in the evaluation tool (questionnaire)
included: 1= least capability, 2= low capability, 3 = moderate capability, 4 = high capability, and 5 = highest
capability.
.
Table 7: Statistical Crosstab for Security Capability by Priority Ranking
Security Capability * Priority Ranking Crosstabulation
Priority Ranking
TotalHigh Priority
Low
Priority
Moderate
Priority
Se
cu
ri
ty
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
Least
Capability
Count 2 1 1 4
Expected
Count .2 2.5 1.3 4.0
Low
Capability
Count 0 12 7 19
Expected
Count 1.0 11.8 6.2 19.0
Moderate
Capability
Count 0 9 2 11
Expected
Count .6 6.8 3.6 11.0
Higher
Capability
Count 0 1 2 3
Expected
Count .2 1.9 1.0 3.0
Total
Count 2 23 12 37
Expected
Count 2.0 23.0 12.0 37.0
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Table 8: Statistical Crosstab for Workforce Group by Priority Ranking
Workforce Group * Priority Ranking Crosstabulation
Priority Ranking
Total
High
Priority
Low
Priority
Moderate
Priority
W
or
kf
or
ce
G
ro
up General ICS
Operations
Count 2 21 11 34
Expected
Count 1.8 21.1 11.0 34.0
Security
Professional
Count 0 2 1 3
Expected
Count .2 1.9 1.0 3.0
Total
Count 2 23 12 37
Expected
Count 2.0 23.0 12.0 37.0
Figure 2: The Least 15 cumulative capability rating (CCR)
As observed in Table 7, 2 of 37 workforce members are in the high priority group, same 2 rated themselves as
having least capability. Similarly, 23 of 37 workforce members are in low priority, and of the 23, 9 self-rated
themselves as having moderate capability, 12 having low capability, and 1 each having least and highest
capabilities. Since our work focuses on weakest link, focused analysis is undertaken on the least capability –
high priority intersection. The row totals revealed 4 workforce members self-rated under least capability, the
column total shows 2 workforce individuals on high priority ranking. A Pearson’s chi-square (x2) value of
20.431 was obtained for these statistics with a 0.002 significance level. The crosstab statistics in Table 8
suggests that there is a rather large difference between the count and expected count in the sample if all self-
rated least capability workforce reactively behaved in like manner of high priority as other grouped workforce
members. However, a 0.002 significance level on the chi-square (x2) value implies the possibility of rejecting
the null hypothesis with only 0.2% chance of being wrong (i.e., less than 1 in 1000 chances of being wrong).
The Null hypothesis could be rejected, and an alternative hypothesis alternative hypothesis (A/Hi): There is a
difference in priority rating levels of the workforce amongst the self-rated security capability groups could be
considered. It can thus be assumed that the workforce self-rated under least capability are more in high priority
ranking group than in others. In the event of such variations, it becomes important to engage with, and
determine the workforce’s view about security capability expectations, and work towards updating and
bringing-up the seemingly low-rated organisation security rating benchmark for personnel to a higher
acceptable level.
Also, testing a second hypothesis (B/Ho) that there is no difference in priority ranking level between the general
ICS operations and security professional workforce yielded a Pearson’s chi-square (x2) value of 0.188 with
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0.910 significance level. The crosstab on Table 8 suggested very negligible difference between the real and
expected priority ranking behaviours of the general ICS operations group. The security group also behaved in
like manner. As expected, the results in the table 8 crosstabs indicated no security professional emerged in the
high priority (low capability) group. Thus, a 0.910 significance suggests a 91% chance of being wrong if we
reject the null hypothesis. This huge likelihood of being wrong informed our basis for not rejecting the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in priority ranking level between the general ICS operations and security
professional workforce.
5.4 Discussion
The above results suggest that irrespective of the number of high security-proficient cybersecurity
professionals in the workforce members in an industrial control environment, the presence of other general
operations ICS workforce members with inherently low capabilities can decrease overall organisational
human-oriented security capacity. Circumstantially, this phenomenon follow similar patterns and disposition
in prior works (Nikolakopoulos, 2009) where human agents (ICS workforce members) with low security
capability (knowledge and skills) ratings are likely to be weak-links, since they pose more conspicuous targets
of attacks.
If all of the workforce evaluated all belong to the same organisation, then the workforce individual with identity
number WF014 represents the security capability of the organisation. Notwithstanding the security capability
strengths of all other workforce members, the organisation can easily be penetrated and compromised to the
security and defence capability of WF014 workforce individual. The organisation would be considered as
weakly penetrable as the capability of ID WF014, who in this context and based on evaluation result is
considered the weakest link. This represents the straw portion of whatever security fences or capability enabled
or imbibed in the entire workforce, and figuratively, a ‘straw’ portion in a brick wall suggests the weakest and
most vulnerable point of breach. Reactively or proactively raising the capability ratings of potential weakest
link (via appropriate control measures) implies raising or strengthening organisational security capability.
Also, a low capability rating in any of knowledge or skills potentially upsets an eventual PSC, and by extension
an organisational capability. A low capability in both attributes suggests an even worse phenomenon.
Essentially, a workforce individual with high security knowledge rating indicates being abreast with evolving
industrial cyber security landscape, but with low security skills rating, indicating a lack or gap in practical
(responsive) proficiency to ensure security within his/her domain, is nearly as weak as the workforce who is
skilled in responding to primordial cyber security threats and attacks but does not constantly keep up with
updates and changes in the security landscape. This is a possible scenario within ICS organisations where
adequate emphasis is not placed on human-factored cyber security assurance. This point re-echoes an earlier
disposition (Beautement et al., 2016), asserting that for security management to be effective, it remains
valuable to evaluate the impact of employee security capability, susceptibility and behaviour, more so, in a
way that supports identifying and ranking capability and susceptibility levels, as well as common security
weak areas.
A related phenomenon is seen to play out in the contrast between self-rated and computed capabilities of the
workforce. The outcome indicates that more industrial workforce members were more aware of cyber-attack
trends and issues than they have the skills to respond appropriately to eventual incidences, despite that most
of the workforce had not undergone any formal education and(or) training on security concepts, norms, and
best practices, an information that would help them acquire appropriate knowledge and skills in the assurance
of cyber security within their working environments. It suggests that while the organisation might feel
comfortable about certain qualities and proficiency levels, personal workforce convictions might not represent
the same opinion. This could result from a lack of updated details in emerging cyber security threat landscape
on the part of the organisation, which is reflected in the test for old and widely known security capabilities. To
avoid such precarious situations, organisations must continually keep abreast with the changing security trends,
and updates evaluations in the light of those changes. Reviews and refinements of the security risk landscape
should be continuous to capture any new or left out changes. Comparing the two results helps the balancing of
security efforts between organisational view and workforce view about security capability.
The analysis of prime security-vulnerable areas reveals an interesting pattern inherent the workforce. The
cumulative capability rating (CCR) of each of the security questions/parameters for all respondents can guide
the identification of prime security knowledge and skill vulnerable areas. A lower CCR value indicates a gap
or weakness in capability, and vice versa. It is therefore presumed that security weaknesses or vulnerabilities
would typically widen or increase with decrease in CCR values. In the analysis of the least 15 CCR values
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selected, the first 3 least CCR values emerged from skill evaluation parameters, and 10 out of the least 15 CCR
values also came from skill evaluation parameters. These suggest a potentially more incapacity and security
gaps in skill than in knowledge of the workforce evaluated. This also presents a correlated perspective when
compared with the overall knowledge and skill capability averages, which indicated a higher average security
knowledge than security practical skill in the workforce.
Grouping the security areas of the least 10 skill CCRs into related family of security controls reveals that the
workforce evaluated are weak in 4 broad areas of security control. These include: Credentials (Password)
Management and Security, Malware (Virus) Detection and Management, Removable Media and Email
Security, and Patch (update) management. The broad areas of theoretical knowledge weaknesses include;
awareness of available security control measures, and knowledge of self-duties and responsibilities towards
overall system security. Most of the identified workforce vulnerability areas are in their weakest states in the
security capability characterisation of the identified weakest link workforce individual (i.e., WF014). In this
context, rather than engage all workforce members in practice training and awareness in all conceivable
security areas, a strategic, cost, time, and resource-effective implementation of control measures for enhancing
cyber security assurance would involve focussed awareness and practical training of selected purported weaker
(more vulnerable) workforce members in the ‘low capability’ areas enumerated. Security assurance
improvement should involve inculcating security proficiencies (knowledge and skills) that are observed to be
lacking, as it may be a waste of time, money, and other resource giving the workforce what they already have.
It is apparent that a single human-factor attribute such as security knowledge alone does not provide sufficient
landscape and information to effectively characterise and represent a human agent’s security aptitude.
Industrial organisations need to cultivate and maintain a culture of continually improving their corporate
security posture and capacity through evaluating and growing the security capacity of their employees
(workforce). This must be driven by an understanding that effective security starts and ends with each human-
agent (workforce) involved with their industrial infrastructure, processes, operations, and services. A better
representation of security capability can be obtained by combining multiple human-factor (workforce)
attributes such as knowledge and skills as demonstrated in the results obtained. A low capability rating in any
of knowledge or skills potentially upsets an eventual PSC, and by extension an organisational capability. Thus,
workforce security capability should be a priority for organisation, for when technical security capacities are
ineffective, fail, or non-available, the security capability of the human agents can provide the last line of dense.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Amidst evolving security trends that places human industrial actors as prime vectors of industrial cyber-attacks,
human-factored security efforts are required to manage and control the menace of prevailing attacks.
Considering that cyber security knowledge and skills capabilities of the industrial workforce (people) is crucial
and strategic towards building a more effective and cybersecurity-compliant workforce. Inordinate records
demonstrate that most successes in the security compromises of industrial control system and network
environments have target and exploited the security capability weaknesses of the human (people) constituents
of industrial/operational environments, especially those with low aptitudes. Securing ICS domains and
networks is no longer the sole responsibility of cybersecurity professionals within the industries, it is a
responsibility shared by all workforce members in the industry. Particularly, the non-security-savvy industrial
operations personnel needs to be considerably knowledgeable and skilled in the act of appropriate and effective
security behaviours and responses, as they are currently more targeted than the security experts.
Directed cyber-attacks on the workforce become effective due to a couple of reasons; like weak or lack of
sufficient cyber security knowledge and skills, negligence, misinformation, all of which can spur inappropriate
behaviour (actions and inactions) enough to neutralise cyber-malicious actions. Technology-based security
solutions alone may not be able to enforce the desired security in the system if the people constituents fail to
recognise and maintain their roles in overall organisation/system security. A lack of cyber security knowledge
is as bad as a lack of cyber security skill, and it is a matter of an organisation and(or) system being as strong
as its weakest link. Potentially, the weaker links in the system/organisation, the lower the potential security
capacity or posture. One way to reduce organisation security vulnerability or risk potential is to enhance
security capability through improving security awareness and training, identifying specific personnel with
security weaknesses, and the specific knowledge or training needs. Humans will always be in the loop (directly
or indirectly), and their competencies would seldom come into play towards achieving certain security
objectives. The application of systematic and strategic analysis of workforce security capacities can spur the
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ICS-driven organisations towards good and well-informed cyber hygiene, and help maintain effective
responses to possible cyber security factors, through removing or reducing weak links in the system. Human-
factored security evaluations is a step towards building robust and resilient cybersecurity capacity in the people
elements of a digital system.
The research provides an approach to identify the security-compliant weakest link in a group of workforce
members. It proffers the first line of defence against potential security threats by activating security
consciousness in the workforce. It also offers a starting point for security evaluators and top management
towards understanding individual workforce security postures, in relations to defined security objectives and
expected baselines. It can (i) help analyse and reveal potential variations in security capability among the
workforce of organisations, (ii) be used to assess organisations’ workforce over or under performance in
security capacity, and (iii) persuade and promote an up-to-date disposition in security expectations and
requirements, (iv) aid the identification of cyber security threats and vulnerabilities that are unique to their
environments. Overall, the evaluation approach proffers a means of measuring the effectiveness of continuous
cybersecurity control and remediation efforts, and speeds-up problem-solving. It also demonstrates potential
to guide organisations into adopting cost-efficient means of thinning and appropriating security remediation
outlines to meet evolving needs, security assurance scopes, and resources without undue wastes or
redundancies. A limitation of the proposed model points to subjectivity where score allocations for responses
in the evaluation tool rely on expert evaluations of perceived risks attributed to any response disposition. It
would be interesting to explore a way of achieving the same allocation via a standardised evaluation approach
and tool to eliminate high-level subjectivity and potential inconsistencies in value allocations. Other future
work in this area also includes developing an automated evaluation tool that can be used to replicate and
quicken the processes outlined in the proposed approach. It would be interesting to consider incorporating
further human attributes like cognitive and behavioural patterns and characteristics to the evaluation scheme.
Work will be done on the incorporating the human-factored attributes into a larger risk-based critical impact
point method for enhancing cyber security assurance.
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